

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 272363
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011

DRAFTED BY AF:BJSALTER

APPROVED BY AF:WCHARROP

S/S-O:TGMARTIN

-----122058 142006Z /42

O 141909Z NOV 77 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 272363

NODIS

CHEROKEE - LONDON FOR MOOSE

FOLLOWING REPEAT MAPUTO 1359 ACTION STATE NOV 12.

QUOTE S E C R E T MAPUTO 1359

NODIS

CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PDEV, RH MZ

SUBJECT: RHODESIAN TALKS: EMBASSY'S ESTIMATE OF MACHEL'S THINKING

1. SUMMARY. TO ASSIST DEPARTMENT IN PLANNING NEXT STEPS IN RHODESIAN TALKS, THE EMBASSY OFFERS ITS ESTIMATE OF PRESIDENT MACHEL'S PROBABLE ATTITUDE REGARDING RECENT RHODESIAN DEVELOPMENTS. WE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 272363

BELIEVE THAT:

-----OWING TO MOZAMBIQUE'S DETERIORATING ECONOMY, THE GOVERNMENT'S INABILITY TO PREVENT RHODESIAN INCURSIONS AND DISILLUSIONMENT WITH DISUNITY WITHIN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, MACHEL IS MORE RECEPTIVE NOW TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT THAN AT ANY TIME BEFORE. BUT HE IS NOT DESPERATE: BEFORE HE AGREES TO A CEASE FIRE HE WILL HAVE TO BE

CONVINCED THAT POWER IN FACT WILL PASS FROM THE SMITH REGIME TO THE NATIONALISTS.

-----AT A MINIMUM, MACHEL WILL INSIST THAT SMITH BE REMOVED, THAT THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES BE DISMANTLED AND THAT THOSE WHO DID THE FIGHTING (1783. ZANU) NOT BE EXCLUDED FROM THE SETTLEMENT. SINCE THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN EMBODIES THESE ESSENTIALS, MACHEL CONSIDERS THE PLAN AS A BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT.

-----MACHEL IS SKEPTICAL THAT SMITH WILL ACCEPT THESE CONDITIONS. UNTIL WE CAN PERSUADE MACHEL OTHERWISE, OR DEMONSTRATE TO HIM HOW WE PLAN TO REMOVE SMITH, MACHEL IS NOT LIKELY TO BE RESPONSIVE TO OUR URGINGS THAT HE (AND THE OTHER FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS) TRY TO PERSUADE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO BE MORE COOPERATIVE. ON THE CONTRARY, WE THINK MACHEL WILL URGE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO HANG TOUGH ON NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING CEASE FIRE AND POST-INDEPENDENCE MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS.

-----WE DO NOT THINK MACHEL IS PLEASED WITH KAUNDA'S RECENT MANUEVERINGS. MACHEL WILL NOT LIKE KAUNDA'S WILLINGNESS TO MAKE A DEAL WITH SMITH, HIS (INITIAL) READINESS TO EXCLUDE MAGABE AND ZANU FROM A SETTLEMENT, AND HIS FAILURE TO CONSULT WITH HIS FRONT LINE COLLEAGUES BEFORE UNDERTAKING THIS INITIATIVE. MACHEL MAY BE DISILLUSIONED WITH MUGABE, BUT HE IS NOT READY TO DITCH HIM OR ZANU FOR NKOMO OR ZAPU. WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT MACHEL WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE ARMED STRUGGLE IF SMITH, WITH OR WITHOUT SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 272363

THE HELP OF KAUNDA, ATTEMPTS TO EXCLUDE ZANU FROM A SETTLEMENT.

-----SINCE MACHEL DOES NOT WANT TO TARNISH HIS RADICAL LEFT-WING CREDENTIALS, HE WILL NOT GET OUT IN FRONT IN CHAMPIONING OUR PLAN, NOR WILL HE WISH TO BE SEEN TO BE WORKING TOO CLOSELY WITH US ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN MATTERS.

2. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

-----WE THINK IT IS PREMATURE TO EXPECT THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS TO LOBBY ON OUR BEHALF WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. MACHEL, FOR ONE, WILL WANT TO SEE SOME EVIDENCE THAT SMITH INTENDS TO COOPERATE OR THAT WE CAN REMOVE HIM BEFORE HE WILL PRESS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO BE MORE COOPERATIVE OR ACCOMMODATING.

-----WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS TO TREAT MUGABE AS A CO-EQUAL OF NKOMO AND WE SHOULD AVOID ACTIONS (E.G. INITIATION OF TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR ZAPU CADRE) THAT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS FAVORITISM FOR ZAPU OVER ZANU OR THE UANC. ONE REASON MACHEL HAS BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF OUR PROPOSAL IS THAT WE HAVE CONVINCED HIM THAT WE WILL NOT TRY TO INFLUENCE ZIMBABWE'S POST-INDEPENDENCE LEADERSHIP. MACHEL'S SUSPICIONS

OF THE WEST, HOWEVER, RUN CLOSE TO THE SURFACE. ANY SUGGESTION THAT WE MAY BE DEPARTING FROM OUR HANDS-OFF POLICY WILL MAKE MACHEL SUSPICIOUS OF THE ENTIRE INITIATIVE.

-----WE SHOULD QUASH QUICKLY ANY EXPECTATION KAUNDA MAY HAVE THAT WE WOULD DISPENSE WITH ELECTIONS. IN OUR OPINION, THE ACCEPTANCE OF ELECTIONS BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND MACHEL HAS BEEN ONE OF THE SUCCESSES OF OUR INITIATIVE, AND GIVES THE PROPOSAL AN OUTSIDE CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE BY THE RHODESIANS. ANY HINT THAT WE MIGHT RECONSIDER COULD PROMPT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND MACHEL TO ENDORSE KAUNDA'S SUGGESTION, AND PLACE GREAT PRESSURE ON US TO RECONSTRUCT THE ENTIRE PROPOSAL. WE ARE NOT PERSUADED THE BLOODSHED IS ANY LESS LIKELY IF WE DISPENSE WITH ELECTIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 272363

3. MACHEL'S COMMITMENT TO LIBERATION. MACHEL AND THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT ARE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN RHODESIA. WE SEE NO SLACKENING IN THIS RESOLVE. A YEAR AND A HALF AGO THERE WAS SOME QUESTION WHETHER MACHEL WAS INTERESTED IN A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. HE SAW THE ARMED STRUGGLE AS NURTURING A REVOLUTIONARY CADRE AND CREATING CONDITIONS FOR A REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY. TODAY MACHEL APPEARS TO BE LESS ATTRACTED TO A PROLONGED STRUGGLE. FOR ONE THING, THE ECONOMY IS IN BAD SHAPE AND HE DESPERATELY NEEDS THE REVENUE, JOBS AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE THAT A RESUMPTION OF TRADE WITH RHODESIA WOULD BRING. SECONDLY, HE IS EMBARRASSED BY HIS ARMY'S INABILITY TO PREVENT RHODESIAN MILITARY INCURSIONS AND FEARS THE EFFECT OF HIS WEAKNESS COULD HAVE ON MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MORALE. THUS, MACHEL SEEMS TO BE READY FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. BUT THE TERMS HAVE TO BE ACCEPTABLE.

4. MACHEL'S MINIMUM CONDITIONS. NO MATTER HOW EAGER HE MAY BE FOR A SETTLEMENT, MACHEL WILL NOT ACQUIESCE IN OR SUPPORT A SETTLEMENT THAT DOES NOT ASSURE THE ACTUAL TRANSFER OF POWER FROM THE SMITH REGIME TO THE ZIMBABWEAN NATIONALISTS. IN MACHEL'S JUDGMENT, SUCH A SETTLEMENT MUST, AT A MINIMUM, PROVIDE FOR THE REMOVAL OF SMITH AND THE DISMANTLING OF SMITH'S SECURITY FORCES, AND ENSURE A ROLE FOR THE FIGHTING FORCES IN AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE.

5. ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN. MACHEL HAS TOLD US THAT THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT. HE IS PLEASED THAT THE PLAN CALLS FOR THE SURRENDER TO THE SMITH REGIME, THAT THE NEW ZIMBABWE ARMY WILL BE BASED ON THE LIBERATION FORCES, AND THAT THE UK IS PREPARED TO ASSUME ITS COLONIAL RESPONSIBILITIES DURING THE TRANSITION. AT THE SAME TIME, HE IS NOT HAPPY WITH SOME OF THE POLITICAL PROVISIONS OF THE PLAN. HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE SOME OF THESE PROVISIONS RENEGOTIATED. WE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 272363

ALSO THINK THAT MACHEL WILL TAKE STRONG EXCEPTION TO SOME OF LORD CARVER'S IDEAS ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE ZIMBABWEAN ARMY AND THAT HE WILL URGE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO INSIST ON A PREDOMINANT ROLE IN THE ARMY. PARITY IS NOT LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO MACHEL. HE IS ALSO LIKELY TO OBJECT TO LORD CARVER'S PROPOSAL THAT THREE BLACK RHODESIAN BATTALIONS BE INCORPORATED INTO THE NEW ZIMBABWEAN ARMY. DRAWING ON MOZAMBIQUE'S EXPERIENCE, MACHEL CONSIDERS THESE BLACK FORCES TO BE UNRELIABLE AND A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF TROUBLE FOR THE NEW ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT. HE WILL ALSO FAVOR A BROADER PURGING OF THE RHODESIAN POLICE THAN THE BRITISH ENVISAGE. FINALLY, UNLIKE MUGABE OR NKOMO, MACHEL CONSIDERS THE UN FORCE TO BE ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL IF PEACE IS TO BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN NOT ONLY WHITES AND BLACKS, BUT BETWEEN CONTENDING BLACK POLITICAL GROUPS AS WELL. MACHEL SHOULD BE HELPFUL TO US IN SEEKING TO OBTAIN INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR A UN FORCE.

6. MACHEL'S SKEPTICISM. MACHEL DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT SMITH WILL EVER AGREE TO TURN OVER POWER VOLUNTARILY. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE IN SMITH'S ACTIONS OF THE PAST FEW MONTHS TO GIVE MACHEL CAUSE TO CHANGE THIS VIEW. AS LONG AS MACHEL REMAINS SKEPTICAL---OR WE CANNOT PERSUADE HIM THAT WE CAN FORCE SMITH'S OUSTER---MACHEL WILL BE RELUCTANT TO URGE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING OR ACCOMMODATING IN THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PLAN OR THE NEGOTIATIONS.

A ONE-TIME LIBERATION LEADER HIMSELF, MACHEL IS DISPOSED TO LET THE ZIMBABWEANS DECIDE THEIR OWN TACTICS AND STRATEGY. HE HAS REPEATEDLY SAID THAT THE ROLE OF THE FRONT LINE STATES IS TO SUPPORT THE ZIMBABWEAN FIGHTING FORCES, NOT TO TELL THEM WHAT TO DO. WE DO NOT THINK MACHEL WILL BE SYMPATHETIC TO OUR SUGGESTIONS THAT HE OR THE OTHER FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. ATTITUDE TOWARDS KAUNDA'S PROPOSAL. BY NOW MACHEL PROBABLY HAS A GOOD IDEA OF WHAT KAUNDA HAS BEEN SAYING TO SMITH AND WHAT KAUNDA MAY BE UP TO. WE DO NOT THINK MACHEL IS PLEASED. AMONG OTHER THINGS,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 272363

MACHEL IS PROBABLY IRRITATED THAT KAUNDA IS READY TO MAKE A DEAL WITH SMITH, THAT HE MAY BE PREPARED TO EXCLUDE MUGABE AND ZANU FROM THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, AND THAT HE CONTINUES TO TRY TO PROMOTE THE POLITICAL FORTUNES OF NKOMO. MACHEL PROBABLY STILL HAS MANY RESERVATIONS ABOUT NKOMO. MACHEL'S TIES HAVE ALWAYS BEEN CLOSER TO ZANU THAN ZAPU AND IT WAS NOT TOO LONG AGO THAT THE MOZAMBIKAN PRESS WAS CHARACTERIZING NKOMO AS AN INSTRUMENT OF

THE WEST. FINALLY, WE THINK MACHEL IS UNHAPPY THAT KAUNDA
IS NOT CONSULTING WITH HIS FRONT LINE COLLEAGUES. WE
WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF HE HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN TALKING TO
NYERERE ABOUT HOW THEY CAN BRING KAUNDA BACK INTO LINE. DE PREE
UNQUOTE VANCE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, CAT-C, CHEROKEE 11-12-77, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, MEETINGS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 14-Nov-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE272363
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: BJSALTER
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: N770007-0554
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 2
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19771161/aaaacams.tel
Line Count: 229
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 2fdbf31a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 10-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 599552
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: RHODESIAN TALKS: EMBASSY'S ESTIMATE OF MACHEL'S THINKING
TAGS: PDEV, RH, MZ, (MACHEL, SAMORA MOISES)
To: LONDON DAR ES SALAAM MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/2fdbf31a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009